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ABSTRACT
The EU’s new generation of  deep and comprehensive free trade agreements not only promote 
EU trade but also have a bearing on the shape of  the European model and in consequence 
on the sustainability of  the integration project. They reach much further than conventional 
free trade agreements. Their benefits hinge on the abolition of  non-tariff  and regulatory 
barriers and enter into areas that are member state competences. Much depends on the 
agreements in question and similarity of  preferences between trading partners. It is up to 
the EU, ultimately for the sake of  the sustainability of  its political integration project, to 
explicitly contemplate not only trade impacts but impacts on the Union’s economic model 
instead of  letting rather than being pushed further down the road by unfolding trade dynamics.
Keywords: Comprehensive free trade agreements; EU regulation and preferences; subsidiarity.
JEL classification: F13; F68; P16
RESUMO
A nova geração de acordos globais de comércio bilateral não promove apenas o comércio 
externo da UE mas tem igualmente um impacto no seu modelo de desenvolvimento e, em 
consequência, na sustentabilidade do projeto de integração europeia. A nova geração de 
acordos vai para além dos convencionais acordos de comércio livre. Os seus benefícios 
dependem da abolição de barreiras não tarifárias e barreiras regulatórias, o que entra na 
esfera de competências dos Estados Membros. Muito depende dos acordos em questão e 
da similitude de preferências entre os parceiros. Em última análise, cabe à UE tomar em 
consideração não apenas os impactos comerciais desses acordos mas também o impacto 
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1. IntroductIon
This article discusses European Union (EU) trade and regulation in the context of  today’s 
world trading system. Its purpose is to spell out the challenges facing the Union as a by-
product of  its trade dynamics, which have been pushing it towards deepening globalization 
further through an ever-increasing number of  deep and comprehensive ‘new generation’ 
trade agreements with a growing geographical reach. While EU trade policy pays tribute 
to European values, it is not clear to what extent the European model – central to the EU’s 
identity - is thereby being upheld, not least in light of  the complexity of  issues involved 
that would need to be contemplated in trade talks. The experience with the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU’s showcase new genera-
tion free trade agreement, has underscored both the complexity of  issue areas and also the 
difficulties associated with ratification. 
Adopting a trade focus tends to overlook that the EU’s new generation deep and com-
prehensive free trade agreements not only promote EU trade but also have a bearing on 
the shape of  the European model and, we argue, in consequence on the sustainability of  
the political integration project.1 Comprehensive and deep free trade agreements are unlike 
conventional free trade agreements in that they reach much further. Whereas the latter do 
away with tariff-barriers to trade and are an exclusive competence of  the Union, the ben-
efits of  comprehensive and deep free trade agreements hinge on the abolition of  non-tariff, 
regulatory barriers and enter into areas that are member state competences.2 If  qualifying 
as a mixed agreement, the ratification of  a trade agreement requires not only consent at 
the EU level but in addition of  all member states (and some regions).3 
The CETA treaty exemplifies the far-reaching rules that govern issues as diverse and 
broad as access to goods and services markets, investments and public procurement; intel-
lectual property rights; sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; sustainable development, 
regulatory co-operation; mutual recognition; trade facilitation; co-operation on primary 
materials; and the resolution of  disputes and of  technical barriers to trade. Fears voiced by 
member states or civil society that deep and comprehensive free trade agreements might 
not correspond to the preferences or values of  society cannot be dismissed out of  hand.4 
For instance, this could be the case if  there was a race to the bottom of  standards through 
regulatory competition and/or regulation being hollowed out by regulatory cooperation and 
1  For a discussion of  the meaning of  the European model, see Bongardt and Torres (2009). In an environmental 
context sustainability denotes the capacity of  a system to reproduce itself  over time. It is here used also in a wider 
context with regard to the resilience of  the EU political system (see Begg et al. 2015). 
2  The Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) clarified the distribution of  competences between mem-
ber states and the EU in its verdict on the Singapore agreement. A comprehensive trade agreement that qualifies as 
a mixed agreement (like CETA) hinges not only on ratification at the EU level but also at the EU member state, and 
in some cases regional, level. 
3  For a discussion see Bongardt and Torres (2017). Applied provisionally since the second half  of  2017, CETA 
is still awaiting ratification by all member states. The EU- Japan agreement, the EU’s largest trade agreement so far, 
was signed in July 2018 and entered into force on 1 February 2019. It still lacks an investment component.





being beyond democratic reach, or when investor state arbitration came to limit the policy 
space for future more stringent consumer and environmental protection. 
This article puts forward that much depends on the agreements in question and similar-
ity of  preferences between trading partners. It is up to the EU, ultimately for the sake of  
the sustainability of  its political integration project, to explicitly contemplate not only trade 
impacts but impacts on the Union’s economic order instead of  letting itself  being pushed 
further down the road by unfolding trade dynamics. Doing so may imply more ‘dialogue’ 
among various levels of  policymaking, according to the subsidiarity principle, more ‘trans-
parency’ rather than negotiations behind closed doors, and more legitimate ‘regulation’, 
rather than investor-state dispute settlements. It would also imply to internalize societal 
concerns, such as longer-term environmental concerns that have for long and consistently 
been among European citizens’ priorities. 
The remainder of  this article is organized as follows. The ensuing section takes stock of  
the essential features of  today’s trading system and the challenges facing the EU in a weakened 
multilateral trade order. Section 3 takes a closer look at the EU’s new generation deep free 
trade agreements and why they imply a qualitative change in EU trade. Section 4 discusses 
the interaction between external trade and EU regulation and the impact on the European 
model. Section 5 argues that the fundamental challenge for the EU to address is a rules 
and value-based international trade order on a sustainable footing. The concluding section 
places EU trade and the European model in the context the European integration project. 
2. today’s rules-Based MultIlateral trade order: weakened and contested
These are testing times for the rules-based international trading order, which Europeans 
(among many others) got accustomed to and used to count on as a source of  growing prosperity 
for much of  the post WWII period, and for today’s globalisation-fuelled international trade. 
Old certainties, where multilateralism seemed a given and the progression of  globalisation 
unstoppable, with world trade feeding on its dynamics, are at best being severely shaken. 
First and foremost, the world trading system faces contestation of  an unprecedented level. 
Far from being any longer the domain of  no-global movements, which have voiced their 
concerns with globalisation for quite some time, the world’s traditional anchor of  free trade 
and fundamental pillar of  the multilateral trade order, the United States (US), changed its 
trade policy course and joined in. The different actors’ motivations for contestation might 
admittedly differ significantly, featuring social and environmental effects on the one side and 
bilateral trade disequilibria on the other. Yet, what cuts across is a notion of  unfairness that 
goes together with certain side effects of  trade perceived as negative. In consequence, the 
progression of  globalisation can no longer be taken for granted and globalisation, and with 
it world trade, might even come to experience some downscaling or unwinding. The EU, 
which has been a staunch supporter of  multilateralism in international trade, finds itself  in 
a context in which trade disputes risk spiralling out of  control into trade wars and the very 
multilateral rules-based trade order is cast in doubt. 
Global trade and growth have undoubtedly greatly benefited from the multilateral frame-
work drawn up under the auspices of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
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and its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It however started to encounter 
sizable problems that await resolution, as the increasingly difficult conclusion of  multilateral 
trade rounds, which culminated in the demise of  the Doha round in 2005, and growing 
frustration with some trade partners’ practices viewed as unfair (most notably China’s5) 
indicate. In response the world has witnessed a proliferation of  bilateral and regional trade 
deals through which countries aim to further their trade interests more directly.
In more recent times, multilateralism and the idea of  international trade as a win-win 
situation received a further, severe blow when the current US administration shifted to an 
‘America first’ stance with a bilateral, zero-sum perspective on and approach to extracting 
benefits from trade.6 In the course of  trying to address its concerns and push for its interests 
with selected trading partners and by recourse to its clout, the US declared the EU, a long-
standing close ally not only in international trade forums, a foe and singled out countries like 
Germany, Japan and China, among others. It suspended the negotiated EU-US Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment partnership (TTIP), did not sign the Trans Pacific Partnership agree-
ment (TPP – subsequently signed by the remaining TPP11 partners under the designation 
of  the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP), 
in whose coming into existence it had taken a leading role, and took to renegotiating an 
existing plurilateral trade agreement with one partner at a time (the case of  the trilateral 
North American free trade agreement (NAFTA), starting with a bilateral agreement with 
Mexico), which gave rise to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the 
trade deal replacing NAFTA. In addition, the US has threatened trade partners with and 
embarked on imposing import trade tariffs. Those unilateral measures have met with re-
taliation, among others by the EU (which imposed countermeasures in the form of  import 
duties on a range of  US products in response to US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium, and 
China), and raised the possibility of  tit-for-tat trade wars (also with the EU, but most acute 
in the case of  China). As for the EU, recent developments (above all, Brexit and the US’s 
stance) have reinforced its external liberalization agenda and it has come to present itself  
as a champion of  free trade in an era of  global populism (de Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2019). 
Alleging, among others, discontentment with a WTO overstepping its competences, US 
actions (blocking the nomination of  judges to arbitration panels) jeopardize the WTO’s func-
tioning, most notably its dispute settlement mechanism, which is central to the multilateral 
rules-based trade order. The WTO has warned that this, together with the US entering into 
trade conflicts with the rest of  the world, risks damaging the WTO as a guarantor of  the 
international system and imperils world trade.7 While the task of  reforming an international 
organization of  164 members, which have different interests but take decisions by unanimity, 
is a steep and cumbersome one that is only possible by building the necessary cross-country 
consensus, it is in the EU’s interest to ensure a workable trade order. In our view, the EU’s 
approach to global trade should not stop there.
5  While the WTO would have been well placed to obtain concessions from China at the time it was to join, 
China has since become a major global trading force.
6  See also Pelkmans (2018) on the implications for EU trade policy. 
7  Declarations by Roberto Azevedo, Director-General of  the WTO:  “Warum wir die Welthandelsorganisation 




At this junction for world trade, the role of  the Union, which is a major player in the 
world trade arena given its market size and openness to trade, becomes pivotal, but a  mere 
defence of  the current system will not do. Rather, the EU faces a two-fold challenge, which 
not only consists of  seeking to uphold a rules-based international order, but also, less obvi-
ously but we would argue crucially so, of  shaping the future world trade order. The latter 
requires that the EU project its values - enshrined in the European model that aims at 
making compatible growth and social and environmental protection - onto the global stage 
through its trade policy. The challenge is especially acute with respect to the de facto still 
largely ignored link between trade and the environment.
3. new generatIon Free trade agreeMents: a QualItatIve change In eu trade
With multilateralism increasingly in crisis, the EU has resorted, at first reluctantly, to 
striking bilateral trade deals. The Union developed trade dynamics that have led it towards 
deepening globalization. In light of  the already rather low tariff  barriers among WTO 
members the EU came to embark on a new generation of  international agreements. It means 
that in most cases, and in the absence of  any one-size-fits-all trade agreement, the Union 
negotiates deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with third countries.8 Recent 
examples of  those deep free trade agreements include the EU-Canada Comprehensive and 
Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement, the EU-Singapore, 
the EU-South Korea, the EU-Vietnam and the EU-Mercosul deep free trade agreements, 
and in the foreseeable future potentially also the United Kingdom, once it becomes a third 
party to the EU.9Yet, abandoning multilateralism tends to distort global trade and harm 
third countries, and there are disadvantages for the EU, too, not least because pursuing (new 
generation) free trade agreements such as the TTIP or CETA rather than trying to revive 
the multilateral Doha round locks the Union into a less dynamic geographical area and 
also has the effect of  excluding other countries and regions, most notably China (Winters, 
2014). The welfare benefits of  deep FTAs are not clear-cut and may even be uncertain. 
None the less, with tariffs already low in international trade, it seemed a logical step for the 
EU to embark on an ever-increasing number and geographical spread of  deep free trade 
agreements that seek to also abolish non-tariff  barriers to trade.10 
Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements establish bilateral rules to govern the 
trade relation. Those do not only influence global norms and standards but also come to 
feed back into and interact with the EU’s economic order in a way that traditional trade 
agreements have not. New generation free trade agreements thereby trigger a qualitative 
change in EU trade: they could reinforce the European model or, in the case where they 
8  There are currently 44 trade agreements in force. Updates of  the state of  play of  EU free trade agreements 
are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/.
9  A discussion of  EU international trade and Brexit can be found Bongardt and Torres (2018a). The impact of  
Brexit on EU trade policy is discussed in de Ville and Gheyle (2019).
10  A review of  studies on the economic effects of  TTIP can be found in Felbermayer (2016). A tariffs-only agree-
ment would have only small effects on trade flows with very low welfare gains. For a comprehensive TTIP, the increase 
in bilateral trade flows would be sizeable, but studies differ substantially with respect to welfare effects. 
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weaken it, risk eroding the trust of  European citizens and economic agents in the Union 
(Bongardt and Torres, 2009). The matter is economically and politically sensitive at a time 
when the European model, as a result of  the limited progress to date with respect to the 
EU’s economic and institutional modernization agenda and on the belated implementation 
of  the social pillar, is still not consolidated. 
Deep trade agreements will promote market-making but may well come to constrain 
market correction. Rather predictably, this creates friction within the EU, not least because 
in many policy areas now included in those agreements it is EU member states that have 
retained competences for market correction. To further complicate matters, new genera-
tion trade agreements imply higher co-ordination needs and raise issues of  preferences and 
sovereignty when invading the competences of  EU member states.  They are likely to affect 
the European model since they address non-tariff  barriers to trade and other issues such as 
investment protection, which interfere with political preferences regarding the role of  the 
state in the economy. Regulation is intrinsically political, too, as it is based on values and 
beliefs. As de Ville and Gheyle (2019) point out, the EU had been insufficiently aware of  
the different nature of  its first deep free trade agreement, TTIP, with regard to its scope 
(and also partner) as compared to other trade negotiations. 11 One result was the politization 
of  TTIP (de Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016 and 2017) and, in its wake, of  CETA (Hübner et 
al. 2017). TTIP and CETA in particular brought to the fore popular concern with the ef-
fects of  globalization on European society and the environment in the context of  EU trade 
policy.12 Public contestation of  the EU’s new generation of  comprehensive trade agreements 
sits uneasily with EU trade dynamics.
A trade focus may easily lead the EU to overlook the complex and potentially broad 
consequences for society of  (deep) economic and trade agreements, as the Belgian region 
of  Wallonia reminded the EU in the case of  the CETA agreement. It was due to contesta-
tion by civil society and especially the refusal by the region of  Wallonia to sign the original 
agreement, which resulted in some amendments before CETA could be signed at the EU-
Canada summit in late October 2016. Wallonia obtained a number of  assurances, inter 
alia, on investor–state dispute settlement (which was initially not even to be replaced by the 
investment court system); regulatory co-operation (requiring common agreement by mem-
ber states); safeguards with respect to genetically modified organisms; and a guarantee of  
the precautionary principle. The European Commission (2015) subsequently modified the 
principles that guide its trade talks, emphasizing that EU trade policy is to become more 
effective with respect to delivering economic results, more transparent and also to not only 
to protect EU interests but to protect and further European values in external trade. 
11  De Ville and Gheyle (2019) argue that even not having gone ahead, TTIP triggered major unintended con-
sequences for the EU, such as demands from third countries to upgrade their trade relationship and unprecedented 
politicization, which affected CETA and brought about reform of  EU trade governance and amendments to EU trade 
policy positions. In their view, EU trade policy has since adapted to the new politics of  trade, thereby making unin-
tended consequences less likely.
12  According to de Ville and Siles-Brügge (2016), TTIP contained a neoliberal agenda bound to bring into the 
trade domain and de-politicize many political areas. The contestation of  TTIP is regarded as an opportunity to bring 




With US commitment to the international trading order increasingly in doubt, the EU 
has a unique opportunity not only to be the anchor of  the international rules-based system 
but to condition it in line with its objectives and values. That would mean to push, notably, 
for labour and environmental standards in trade agreements, something that the European 
Commission has not yet fully embraced. However, treating trade issues without due regard 
to the EU’s wider objectives risks becoming a credibility issue for the EU. In the EU-Japan 
trade agreement, the EU made a first step in this direction by making observance of  the 
Paris climate agreement a prerequisite, albeit belatedly and without much detail.13 
Generally speaking, bilateral new generation free trade agreements in principle offer 
the EU an easier and speedier way to advance European goals and project its values onto 
the global stage in comparison with multilateral forums. The EU could aim to be a global 
rule maker. 14  Yet, there is little evidence that it has even aimed at doing so. Young (2015) 
finds that the EU has not used regulatory coordination to try to export its rules and that it 
has generally settled for granting equivalence. Unsurprisingly, critiques persist and centre 
on fears that those trade agreements could undermine environmental and labour standards 
and give multinational firms the power to challenge national laws and limit the EU’s and 
member states’ regulatory space. 
Even more preoccupying from an EU point of  view, the backlash against the effects of  
globalization became directed against the Union, which was perceived as prioritizing eco-
nomic (commercial) interests over making sure that its economic goals were compatible with 
societal (social and environmental) concerns. The incompleteness of  the European model 
has fuelled fears of  the potential impact of  comprehensive agreements on policy domains 
beside narrow trade in goods, many of  which have remained in the EU member state sphere. 
They regard the fleshing out of  a European model in line with European citizens’ present 
or evolving preferences. The politization motivated the European Commission (2015) to 
update its trade policy.
4. InteractIon Between external trade and eu regulatIon and IMpact on the 
european Model
The EU’s new generation of  deep trade agreements magnifies the issue of  regulation, 
which is already complex in internal EU trade, in an international trade context (Bongardt 
and Torres, 2018b). In addition, external trade and regulation interact and impact on the 
European model, a fact that any discussion on what should be the EU’s approach to global 
trade needs to take into account.
The issue of  market making versus market correcting – or negative versus positive inte-
gration, in the terminology of  Tinbergen (1954) – gives a foretaste of  the issues (of  a much 
larger scale) at stake in new generation free trade agreements. The CETA case illustrated 
that rules on regulation in deep and comprehensive trade agreements, such as through 
13  With a view to obtain the CETA trade agreement, the European Commission had facilitated trade in highly 
polluting Canadian tar sands.
14  The issue of  the EU as a rule-maker or rule-maker under TTIP is analysed by Hamilton and Pelkmans (2015). 
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regulatory co-operation, mutual recognition or investment court arbitration, may come to 
limit the European and national policy space. 
As Pelkmans (2013) lays out, most EU-level rules currently refer to risk regulation, which 
pursues safety, health, environmental and consumer protection objectives. This risk regula-
tion concerns mostly goods and services markets – for example financial market regulation 
and supervision, and network industry aspects – and only sporadically labour and capital 
markets. On a more horizontal level, it includes environmental regulation and consumer 
protection and rights. The precautionary principle, enshrined in the treaties, is an important 
EU principle in this context. 
What made regulation-based integration possible in the EU, economically and politically 
speaking, was sufficient similarity of  preferences. Heterogeneity of  preferences is accom-
modated by the single market’s mutual recognition principle, which implies competition 
between regulatory systems, and requires its societal acceptability. The rejection of  the 
original (Bolkestein) services directive, based on the home country principle, illustrates well 
the political difficulties with co-existing different national regulation even within the EU.
Mutual recognition is a basic principle for single market functioning in European va-
rieties of  capitalism. It exists only in the single market framework, providing a fall-back 
solution to accommodate different preferences that do not allow for establishing common, 
European standards. Crucially, it presupposes a degree of  trust that rules will be similar 
in their effect as well as supervision and enforcement capacity. Note that as a principle it 
has at times proven problematic even in a European context, once it allows for regulatory 
arbitrage (competition between regulatory systems) in an EU that has become ever more 
heterogeneous after successive enlargements.15
The economic case for EU deep and comprehensive trade agreements rests on realizing 
largely untapped benefits from abolishing non-tariff  barriers to trade. Still, trade and wel-
fare effects are complex and may even be ambiguous.16 Those free trade agreements tend 
to have broader implications for society and influence its model of  development (Rodrik, 
2016). Those are conditioned by the scope of  the agreements in question (e.g., covering 
areas like public or regulated services, intellectual property rights, investment protection).
Akin to issues raised by regulation in the single market, non-tariff  barriers to trade and 
the inclusion of  other issues such as investment protection interfere with political preferences 
on the role of  the state in the economy and also highlight the role of  regulation, which is 
also intrinsically political as it is based on values and beliefs. Acceptance is not a given and 
ratification more complex and uncertain once they encroach on member state competences. 
The market making versus market correcting issue, which features prominently in the internal 
market context, is an even larger issue in deep free trade agreements. 
The contestation of  CETA and TTIP in the EU showed that trust might be limited even 
with regard to a fellow G7 country. Still, there is no mutual recognition in EU international 
trade. The principle only exists in the single market framework and not with regard to third 
15  The issue of  harmonized standards for financial services is a case in point.
16  With respect to TTIP, Connell et al. (2018) argue the costs of  non-TTIP are even larger if  one takes into 
account complex global value chains. They conclude that while those potential benefits are substantial, they derive 





countries. Instead, the EU may grant equivalence to third country regulation (which, unlike 
mutual recognition, is not automatic and can be revoked at relatively short notice). Young 
(2015) points out that the EU makes little use of  regulatory coordination, that it customarily 
grants equivalence and that it does not try to export its standards.
The CETA case illustrated that rules on regulation in comprehensive trade agreements, 
such as through regulatory cooperation, mutual recognition or investment court arbitration, 
may come to limit the European and national policy space. Those were also key elements in 
the contestation of  TTIP. The EU had been prepared to go further under TTIP with the 
US than the US had been under TPP, with deeper agreement on regulatory issues, covering 
three broad areas, namely market access, regulatory issues and non-tariff  barriers, and rules.
To the extent that comprehensive agreements come to constrain market correction – for 
instance by pre-empting higher standards via regulatory coordination, putting downward 
pressure on existing ones via equivalence or limiting future regulation through investment 
protection - they can reinforce negative integration tendencies in the EU by putting down-
ward pressure on standards through trade. To hope otherwise would require a notion of  
similarity with regard to third countries that is already stretched even within the Union. 
It is worth noting that through the bilateral rules established in the context of  a com-
prehensive trade agreement the EU may not only influence global norms and standards but 
that those also come to feed back into and interact with the EU’s economic order in a way 
that traditional trade agreements have not. They can thus reinforce the European model or 
in case of  weakening it, risk eroding trust of  European citizens and economic agents in the 
Union.17 The matter is economically and politically sensitive at a time when the European 
model, as a result of  the limited progress to date with respect to the EU’s economic and 
institutional modernization agenda and on the belated implementation of  the social pillar, 
is still not consolidated. 
5. the FundaMental challenge For the eu to address: a rules and value-Based 
InternatIonal trade order on a sustaInaBle FootIng
First and foremost, the EU is seeking to uphold the multilateral trade order, de-escalate 
trade conflicts and defuse looming trade wars. Doing so it is treading a fine line in its trade 
policy. For a global player like the EU it becomes a matter of  credibility to adequately 
respond to US unilateral actions and not give in to threats, whereas it is not in its interest 
to let trade conflicts escalate and be drawn into trade wars. Those are costly in real terms 
once they pose a serious risk to activity in the short to medium term and to the outlook for 
global trade (ECB, 2018). The EU opted to engage with the US and to find some common 
ground; after all, there are some shared interests and concerns, such as WTO reform or 
issues with market access discrimination and intellectual property right protection in China. 
Bilateral trade remains important, regardless of  the fact that the EU-US TTIP, the EU’s first 
comprehensive trade agreement, intended to create a common transatlantic marketplace 
17  Europeans’ attachment to high sanitary, food and environmental standards (including upholding the precau-




EU TradE and rEgUlaTion: 
Economic and PoliTical dynamics 
57
with low barriers to trade and investment and with aspirations to shape the world trade 
order, ended up as the EU’s only one that did not advance. Formally on ice by decision of  
the current US administration, the EU-US trade deal was very much contested in the EU 
where it proved unsellable in light of  the reach of  third country regulatory autonomy on 
EU territory. Still, as de Ville and Gheyle (2019) point out, TTIP had lasting if  unintended 
effects on the evolution of  EU trade policy.
The EU has pursued two parallel strands of  action. To start with, it attempts to achieve a 
negotiated settlement with the US on the WTO. The EU regards the WTO, in particular its 
role in global trade disputes, as vital for upholding a rules-based international trading order. 
Since no clarity exists as to whether the US administration intends to reform the WTO or 
do away with it, the EU drew up reform proposals that take up the kind of  complaints that 
the US has raised, in a move meant to test the US’s willingness to work constructively on 
its critiques (and consequently lift its opposition to the judges on dispute settlement panels) 
or otherwise call its bluff  with regard to its stated commitment to engage with the EU on 
WTO reform.  
At the same time, the Union has, rather successfully, sought to augment and strengthen 
its trade ties and to strategically close ranks with like-minded trading partners.18 The shared 
concern - the new US stance did not only raise the EU’s resolve to sustain free trade but also 
the importance of  securing free trade for many other countries - has predictably promoted 
and accelerated new EU trade deals with existing and prospective trading partners.19 
Apart from EU trade dynamism, US protectionism opened up a strategic space in which 
the Union could seek to also condition global trade in line with its preferences for growth 
with high environmental and social standards. The crucial question remains to what extent 
the EU is willing to put this capacity to good use. 
The meeting between Commission president Juncker and US president Trump on 25 
July 2018 in Washington, realized at the initiative of  the EU, resulted in an agreement to 
suspend a war on trade tariffs and work toward an accord (European Commission, 2018). 
It also gives clues on the EU’s priorities in trade and on the kind of  compromises that the 
EU looks prepared to make in the name of  external trade. 
The EU managed to achieve a (even if  temporary) truce (no additional US import tariffs 
on cars from the EU) as long as a perspective EU-US trade agreement is negotiated, without 
apparently making substantial concessions to the US. The US is to reassess (rather than 
lift, however) its punitive tariffs. The EU commits to raising imports from the US in certain 
sectors (more soybeans, which would make up for reductions of  US exports to China, in 
face of  Chinese retaliations to US policy, and more American liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
hereby competing with Russian gas and diversifying EU energy supplies). The parties also 
18  For an explanation of  this new policy stance, see Bongardt and Torres (2017). More recently, the EU has 
teamed up with Canada (a possible blueprint for agreements with other trading partners) to ensure that (bilateral) 
arbitration panels will be operational to deal with trade conflicts once the WTO’s do not function any more for lack 
of  judges.
19  For instance, CPTPP countries turned to the EU to make (or accelerate or deepen) free trade and investment 
deals. There has also been a fresh impetus for a number of  free trade negotiations that were previously slow-moving 




commit to negotiating a comprehensive tariff  reduction for industrial goods and a reform 
of  the WTO (as referred above). 
For the time being the truce holds but it is fragile. The scope of  the agreement has turned 
out to be ambiguous apart from contentious within the EU (Is agriculture in or out? Is the 
idea to reactivate the wide TTIP or a reduced version of  it?).20 And to cement the truce, the 
EU has already made further offers (higher quotas for non-hormone US beef  exports, to lift 
all car tariffs if  the US reciprocates), however already qualified as insufficient by the US.21 
If  we accept the argument that what matters is that the agreement ended the escalation 
of  tit-for-tat tariffs and averted a trade war (Gros, 2018), then the question at what price, 
if  any, becomes relevant. After all, any potential benefits of  reviving TTIP depend heavily 
on doing away with regulatory barriers. However, the TTIP was heavily contested because 
of  the concern that any such deal might come at the expense of  EU (present or future) 
standards (notably high sanitary, food and environment standards). 
The EU Commission, often accused in the past of  privileging trade liberalization over 
societal (labour, environmental) concerns, has hence committed to internalizing those 
concerns in trade and to protect the EU’s high standards (European Commission, 2015). 
Judging by this measure, the EU-US agreement risks sending the wrong signals. The EU 
abandoned its customary defence of  the Paris Climate Agreement and of  environmental 
standards for the sake of  achieving a suspension of  US trade sanctions. And although any 
concessions may appear symbolic since higher imports of  US soybeans and LNG rest on 
market decisions, those are two areas that happen to be rather sensitive on environmental 
grounds (genetically modified agricultural products and gas produced through fracking). 
The objective to internalize environmental externalities on efficiency and environmental 
grounds and to work towards the European model through external trade appears to have 
been sidelined in the name of  trade. In fact, Young (2019) finds that the EU’s updated trade 
policy in response to the politization of  trade policy (TTIP, CETA) and anti-globalization 
movements reflects continuity with past practices. 
6. concludIng reMarks on eu trade and the european Model
Pragmatism that privileges trade over European values does not bode well for the defence 
and even less promotion of  the European model through EU external trade policy. In the 
face of  vocal criticism of  the negative side effects of  international trade, combined with the 
20  The Juncker deal risked disrupting European unity. Favoured by Germany (with an automotive industry 
strongly exposed to US sanctions), France rejects a wide TTIP-style agreement and the inclusion of  agriculture. It is 
also opposed to the EU negotiating while sanctions are active. In any case, renewed trade negotiations would require 
a mandate for the Commission and the European Parliament would also have a word to say (limiting the role of  expert 
groups).
21  Perhaps more importantly in practice, the US is already experiencing that in today’s globalised world (with 
features like complex supply chains), trade policy can be a double-edged sword, so that tariffs hurt not only foreign 
but also domestic economic agents through more expensive inputs, and that trade partners retaliate against punitive 
tariffs, and prefers to focus more on China for the time being.
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rise of  populism22, the EU needs to face up to the challenge to condition globalization in 
order to make the European model work for and deliver results for its citizens, in line with 
European values and objectives.23 Even though some progress has been made, the European 
Commission still needs to fully internalize those values also in its trade policy and actively 
push for them in order not to risk a backlash against international trade and the Union. 
With the US’s commitment to the international trading order increasingly in doubt, the EU 
has a unique opportunity to be an anchor of  an international rules and value-based system 
and to use its clout to push notably for high labour, environmental and climate standards 
in trade agreements, something that the European Commission has embraced in theory but 
seemingly not yet in practice.
In theory bilateral trade agreements offer the EU an easier and speedier way to advance 
European goals and project its values onto the global stage than multilateral forums. On 
the downside, they could also come to lower environmental and labour standards and give 
multinational firms the power to challenge national laws and limit the EU’s and member 
states’ regulatory space. A trade focus easily may – and we would argue did – lead the EU 
to overlook the complex and potentially broad consequences for society of  the new genera-
tion economic and trade agreements. Suffice it to recall here that the EU only belatedly 
integrated the environment and the Paris Climate Agreement in recent trade deals (with 
Japan and South Korea) that it abandoned the climate issue to achieve a trade truce with 
the US, and that in the newest trade deal (the EU-Mercosul agreement), the potential en-
vironmental impact (of  agricultural trade on the deforestation of  the Amazon forest) might 
still derail the ratification of  the mixed agreement.24 
In the authors’ view, it is not only EU external trade that is at stake if  a trade focus 
trumps the European model. It could damage trust in European institutions if  EU wider 
objectives were to be alienated in the name of  trade, to deliver growth in the short run, 
regardless of  its quality and impact on society. The approach that the EU takes to global 
trade will define its credibility as a global actor but, perhaps more importantly, impact 
on the sustainability of  the European integration project. The issue is whether the Union 
actively works towards a rules and value based international order, which delivers on EU 
preferences for quality growth and fairness and which prioritizes the overdue link between 
22  The success of  anti-EU populist parties in continental Europe, especially in France, derives partly from oppo-
sition to a (Anglo-Saxon-type) deregulated economic model and a neglect of  the European model. It stresses the 
importance of  fairness for the success of  the European economy and of  the European project. The social chapter is 
an expression of  the EU seeking to complete its model in the social sphere. See Bongardt and Torres (2019). 
23  For Young (2019), the Commission’s assessment of  the politicization of  trade policy is exaggerated. In his view 
its wrong assumptions have however produced the right policy, that is, a less politically fraught EU trade policy. That 
assessment does not take into account the importance of  the European model for the future of  the European integra-
tion project, which we want to stress.
24  It is also not yet clear whether Brazil will stay in the Paris Climate Agreement, which would seem a precondi-
tion for the deal. Former French Environment Minister Hulot qualified the EU-Mercosul trade deal as completely 
contradictory to the bloc’s climate goals (https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/07/01/eu-mercosur-trade-deal-
will-drive-amazon-deforestation-warns-ex-minister/, consulted on 14 July 2019). Often characterised as cows for cars, 
the trade deal has been criticized due to cattle being the biggest driver of  deforestation of  the Amazon (followed by 
soy beans and timber) and the violation of  indigenous peoples’ rights (https://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/issues/




environmental sustainability and trade. EU’s self-declared leadership role in combating 
climate change provides a test case for its resolve. After all, economic growth cannot be 
sustained over time if  the limits of  the planet are not accounted for nor is trade sustainable 
if  negative externalities are not priced in.
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